Introduction: A new role for emotions in Epistemology? by Brun, G & Kuenzle, D
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2008
Introduction: A new role for emotions in Epistemology?
Brun, G; Kuenzle, D
Brun, G; Kuenzle, D (2008). Introduction: A new role for emotions in Epistemology? In: Brun, G; Doguoglu, U;
Kuenzle, D. Epistemology and Emotions. Aldershot, 1-31.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Brun, G; Doguoglu, U; Kuenzle, D 2008. Epistemology and Emotions. Aldershot, 1-31.
Brun, G; Kuenzle, D (2008). Introduction: A new role for emotions in Epistemology? In: Brun, G; Doguoglu, U;
Kuenzle, D. Epistemology and Emotions. Aldershot, 1-31.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Brun, G; Doguoglu, U; Kuenzle, D 2008. Epistemology and Emotions. Aldershot, 1-31.
DR
AF
T
Introduction
A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology?
Georg Brun and Dominique Kuenzle
This paper provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates
about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key
issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various
assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then
distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions:
motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-
propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic
efficiency. We identify two core issues in the discussions about such
epistemic functions of emotions: First, even though it is plausible that
emotions are involved in epistemic processes, it may be doubted whether
they really matter for the normative question of what counts as knowledge
or justified belief. Second, some of the epistemic functions claimed for
emotions in general may only be attributed to some specifically epistemic
emotions, which have been present all along in traditional epistemology,
albeit under different labels such as ‘intuitions’.
Epistemic activities can be very emotional affairs. Curiosity, doubt, hope and fear
trigger everyday cognitive activities as well as academic research, which in turn are
sources of surprise, frustration and joy. Less intellectual emotions may also play their
part when tireless scrutinizing is driven by jealousy, or when an experiment is too
disgusting to occur to any researcher.
Nevertheless, emotions did not play a significant role in traditional epistemology
and if they were paid any attention at all, they were mainly thought of as impairing
cognition. Recently, however, epistemologists and emotion theorists have started to
discuss the question of whether the epistemological standing of emotions needs to be
reassessed. Are there epistemic functions that can be assigned to emotions? And which
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emotions are suitable candidates for these functions? These questions are at the centre
of this collection of essays.
The significance some epistemologists have attributed to emotions over the last
ten years or so can arguably be claimed to be new in the context of contemporary
English speaking epistemology. Emotions entered epistemology discussions in the
1990s after having been reintroduced to ethics and moral philosophy some decades
earlier. This development has been helped by the rediscovery of emotions in cognitive
science (Antonio Damasio’s Descartes’ Error among the best-known examples1) and
by epistemology becoming more closely associated with action theory and moral
philosophy, as in virtue epistemology. But while the cognitive significance of emotions
was quickly acknowledged and, under headings like ‘emotional intelligence’, made it to
newspapers, general interest magazines and self-help books, most epistemologists have
been less enthusiastic about emotions. For instance, in Blackwell’s 1992 Companion to
Epistemology (Dancy and Sosa 2001), ‘emotion’ is not even listed in the index (neither
are related terms, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘affect’) and nothing significant can be found in
Kluwer’s 2004 Handbook of Epistemology (Niiniluoto et al. 2004). Over the last
decade, however, many strands of research centring on the nature and function of
emotions have led to important insights and adjustments, both within and outside of
epistemology.
While this introduction focuses on recent research, one should not forget that the
idea that emotions matter a great deal in epistemology has a longer history. An example
can be found in a surprising passage of Moritz Schlick’s On the Foundation of
Knowledge, where he explicitly uses satisfaction, fulfilment and even joy as the criteria
for successful validation of inductively achieved hypotheses:
[We] pass an observational judgement that we expected, and have in doing so a sense of fulfilment, a
wholly characteristic satisfaction; we are content. It is quite proper to say that the affirmations or
observation statements have fulfilled their true mission, as soon as this peculiar satisfaction is
obtained. … Once the prediction comes to pass, the aim of science is achieved: the joy in knowledge
is joy in verification, the exaltation of having guessed correctly. … Are our predictions actually
realized? In every single case of verification or falsification an ‘affirmation’ answers unambiguously
with yes or no, with joy of fulfilment or disillusion. The affirmations are final. (Schlick [1934], 382–
3)
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Affirmations (‘Konstatierungen’) are a core element of Schlick’s foundationalism and,
it turns out, they have their ‘true mission’ in eliciting emotional responses. The
immediate joy of seeing a hypothesis confirmed and the disappointment of experiencing
it falsified make it possible for affirmations to provide the infallible foundation of
knowledge and science. This basic function of emotions is echoed in Quine’s
observation that Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’ is best dealt with by appealing to
a feeling of simplicity (Quine 1960, 19). Recently, Christopher Hookway picked up on
this remark (Hookway 2003a, 81; Hookway, this vol., p. 000), using it as a starting
point for his own contribution to the current debate on emotions and epistemology.
Goodman himself started to highlight the epistemological significance of the emotions
in the 1960s (Goodman 1976, ch. VI.4). His arguments for adopting understanding,
instead of knowledge, as the central epistemic goal were taken up by Catherine Elgin,
who developed a comprehensive account of epistemology that gives emotions a
prominent role (Goodman and Elgin 1988; Elgin 1996).
In what follows, we first sketch some traditional stances and more recent
developments in epistemology (section 1) and the theory of emotions (section 2). On
this basis, we will then (section 3) present a survey of various ways in which emotions
recently have been claimed to be relevant to epistemology, followed by a brief
discussion of some possible objections to the proposed reappraisals of emotions in
epistemology (section 4).
1. Background in Epistemology
Recent developments within philosophical epistemology have prepared the ground for
attributing epistemic significance to emotions. These developments are best understood
against the background of some core features of traditional epistemological thinking.
Features of Traditional Epistemology
Within the philosophical tradition, epistemology has tended to present itself not as an
empirical, but as a normative discipline, often motivated by a wish to answer sceptical
challenges. Philosophical epistemologies explore the grounds and validity of
knowledge. While the question of how we go about acquiring and maintaining
knowledge has countless aspects that call for empirical investigations, epistemology as
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traditionally understood attempts to tell us what counts as acquiring or having
knowledge.
Accordingly, questions of the validity of epistemic claims (e.g. evaluating
something as epistemically justified, attributing knowledge to somebody) are often
contrasted with questions of their formation or genesis, and only the former are treated
as epistemologically relevant. This view is often presented by recourse to the distinction
between the ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of justification’. The resulting
picture with respect to the emotions is familiar enough. Research, actual processes of
discovering and justifying, may well be driven by all sorts of emotions, such as
curiosity or fear of dropping out of an academic career, but these emotions do not play
any part in evaluating whether the results of research add to our knowledge. Emotions
are important in the context of discovery as they influence the way researchers actually
proceed. Nevertheless, they are irrelevant to the context of justification since the
validity of the results is independent of such emotions. We will discuss this stance in
more detail in section 4.
A considerable part of traditional epistemological theorizing includes a further
assumption that contributes to a situation in which emotions were not perceived as
epistemologically relevant. Clearly present in Descartes’ Meditations (Descartes [1641])
and prevalent in traditional foundationalist epistemological projects, certainty or
infallibility have been conceived as requirements of knowledge. This prioritizes
deductive over inductive inferences and it leads to quests for infallible epistemic
foundations and algorithms to choose between competing theories. On the face of it,
emotions do not make promising candidates for such processes, since their cognitive
output seems particularly fallible. The feeling of jealousy, for example, may
occasionally help to discover facts that would otherwise go unnoticed; thus it may help
acquire knowledge. But all too often it results in nothing but ill-founded suspicion (see
Goldie, this vol.).
Apart from attempts to formulate and answer sceptical challenges or epistemic
regress worries (e.g. by recourse to foundationalism), contemporary analytic
epistemology has long been preoccupied with analysing key epistemic concepts such as
(epistemic) justification and, above all, propositional knowledge. Analysis in terms of
justified true belief has served as a promising starting point. Again, this model is
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unfavourable to emotions as long as the justification condition remains tied to
inferential relations between beliefs. To say that subject S knows that p is to say that S
truly believes that p and that this belief is epistemically justified. Whether p is justified
depends primarily on its inferential relations to S’s beliefs.
Developments Within Epistemology
A range of more or less recent developments have shaped epistemology in favour of
emotions. In this respect, debates about the justification condition of knowledge have
been especially influential. According to an important proposal, what is needed for
subject S to know that p is not that S be in a position to give reasons for p, but that S be
in a position to rule out relevant alternatives to p (Dretske 1970; Goldman 1976).
Attempts to determine what counts as epistemically relevant in any given situation soon
opened the door to considerations previously thought of as alien to epistemology. Some
difference between real, felt doubts and idle philosophical paper doubts, for example,
could be used to establish that blind tasting Barolo is a relevant alternative to blind
tasting Chianti, whereas being a brain in a vat is not. As we will describe in section 3,
epistemic relevance and salience have become some of the most discussed functions of
emotions within epistemology (see de Sousa 1987; Elgin 1996; Hookway 2003b).
In further attempts to remove the justification condition from the epistemic
subject’s cognitive control, it was argued that for a true proposition p to count as
knowledge, it matters not so much whether the subject is in a position to give reasons
for p. Instead, we better ask whether p was produced in an appropriate way, for instance
by suitable causal chains (Goldman 1967), by reliable belief-forming mechanisms
(Goldman 1976) or by properly functioning cognitive equipment (Plantinga 1986). To
some extent, such moves towards ‘externalist’ theories of epistemic justification have
blurred the traditional distinction between context of discovery and context of
justification. After all, causal chains and the kinds of mechanism that produce or fix
beliefs are features of the formation of knowledge.
But even though emotions are often part of processes of knowledge production,
they did not immediately attract the externalists’ attention. It was largely assumed that
the function of the justification condition, whether spelt out in internalist or externalist
terms, is to rule out beliefs that are merely accidentally true. Consequently, only those
DR
AF
T
features of belief-forming processes that systematically contribute to the truth of their
products were seen as normatively, and hence epistemologically, relevant. Insofar as
emotions seem particularly fallible, they do not seem epistemologically relevant.
The case for emotions is strengthened once principled questions are raised with
respect to counterexamples to various analyses of the concept of knowledge. As Hilary
Kornblith has recently insisted, at the end of the day we are not interested in our
concepts of knowledge and epistemic justification, but in knowledge and justification
themselves (Kornblith 2006, 12). Mark Kaplan (1985, 354) makes a similar point when
he argues that unless it concerns the ‘proper conduct of inquiry’, analysis of the concept
of knowledge is idle. The underlying view of epistemology is that it should primarily
aim at ‘understanding and advancing rational inquiry’ (Kaplan 1985, 362).
Hookway (1990) suggests a similar shift away from characteristics of static belief
systems to epistemic activities. This move is motivated by a pragmatist interpretation of
sceptical challenges. Hookway thinks that sceptical challenges undermine the idea that
we can simultaneously understand ourselves as participating in normatively regulated
inquiries and as autonomous, responsible agents (Hookway 1990, 215). For him, this
move towards practices and processes goes together with a widening of the
epistemological focus from propositional knowledge to epistemic evaluations in
general, as has also been argued for by Goodman and Elgin (1988; Elgin 1996).
Various considerations and claims have been put forward to defend such a
development. Knowledge may just be ill chosen as the goal of epistemic activities. It
may be too hard to achieve (especially if the tripartite analysis is correct) or it may
impose inapplicable standards to our inquiries. Furthermore, knowledge, as it is
typically discussed in epistemology, is restricted to propositions. But propositional
knowledge may rest upon non-propositional elements, such as categories, concepts and
methods. Or it may even be better approached in terms of knowing how to do certain
things, such as conducting inquiries or revising one’s beliefs.
Elgin (1996) argues that inquiry is better seen in terms of striving for
understanding than in terms of knowledge acquisition. If analysis of epistemic processes
is not restricted to their propositional results, but includes non-propositional
components of understanding, then values, rules, categories and methods may be
epistemically evaluated along with judgements or assertions (Elgin 1996, 122). Related
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considerations have led to a weakening of the truth-requirement in epistemic
evaluations to acceptability (Goodman and Elgin 1988), tenability (Elgin 1996) or
‘enough’ truth (Elgin 2004) to make room for approximations and even fictions that
contribute to understanding (Elgin 1996, esp. 122–7; see the discussion in Wild, this
vol.).
Such moves towards epistemic processes and activities highlight aspects and
properties of epistemic agents that have previously been neglected. Emotional states can
be seen as part of this new, broader picture, which is also influenced by philosophers of
science such as Kuhn or Feyerabend, who argue for broadly construed scientific
rationality to replace the logical empiricists’ ideal of logical procedures in matters of
theory choice. One way of spelling out such a notion of rationality appeals to scientists’
decision making. Harold Brown, for example, models the rational scientist on
Aristotle’s man of practical wisdom, who is
… a model of the maker of crucial scientific decisions which cannot be made by appeal to an
algorithm, and I offer the making of these decisions as a model of rational thought. It is the trained
scientist who must make these decisions, and it is the scientists, not the rules they wield, that provide
the locus of scientific rationality. (Brown 1977, 149)
Ernest Sosa (1980; 1985), James Montmarquet (1993) and Linda Zagzebski (1996; see
also DePaul and Zagzebski 2003) undercut the distinction between internalist and
externalist theories of epistemic justification by adopting the notion of virtue from
ethical theory and focusing on epistemic or intellectual virtues.2 This amounts to a
reversal of direction of epistemological analysis. In the traditional order, epistemic
evaluations of propositions, sentences or mental states were analysed first, and
epistemic agents, acts and processes were then accounted for in terms of these analyses.
Virtue epistemologists, however, start with normative properties of epistemic agents.
Emotions come to play parts within such a strategy by contributing to the analysis of the
epistemically relevant virtues or character traits (cf. the critique of Wild, this vol.).
Lorraine Code’s (1984; 1987) and Alvin Goldman’s (1986; 1999) social
epistemology further widens the scope from individual epistemic agents to processes
within epistemic communities, while feminist epistemologists and philosophers of
science examine whether, and in what ways, the gender of epistemic agents may be
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epistemically significant. The epistemic agent’s emotional involvement is one aspect of
the gender differences that are discussed in this context (Jaggar 1989; Diamond 1991).
Two more developments inside and outside philosophy should be mentioned as
having led to a surge of interest in emotions. In philosophy, Quine (1969) and others
have initiated the project of naturalizing epistemology by assimilating it to psychology
and cognitive science. Similar considerations fuelled hopes for a naturalized theory of
mental states and concepts, which have contributed to the tendency to assign
philosophical significance to empirical research on belief-forming processes and belief-
revision (see Fodor 1984; Fodor 1987; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Goldie, this vol.). At
roughly the same time, philosophical theories of emotions that emphasize their
cognitive significance have been revived (e.g. Kenny [1963]), while the cognitive
revolution in psychology started to give emotions a central place (see Lazarus 1999).
Some twenty years later, the time was ripe for fusing these trends. Ronald de Sousa
(1987) and Damasio ([1994]) combined cognitivist and naturalist aspects with great
effect.
In summary, we can identify the following developments within philosophical
epistemology that invite epistemological discussions of emotions: relevant alternative
accounts and externalism about epistemic justification; calls for a theory of epistemic
agents and practices, paradigmatically as opposed to conceptual analysis; opening the
focus from propositional knowledge to epistemic evaluations in general; criticism of
narrowly construed epistemic rationality within the philosophy of science; the recent
prominence of virtue epistemology, discussions of social and feminist epistemology;
and finally, the rise of cognitive science and naturalized epistemology.
2. The Landscape of Emotions
Any exploration of possible epistemic functions of emotions presupposes some
understanding of the variety and nature of emotion phenomena. In this section, we
highlight a few general points that help to structure discussions of emotions and to
avoid some sources of misunderstanding.
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The Variety of Emotions
The first thing worth noting about the concept of emotion is the number and variety of
emotion terms. Empirical research suggests that about 300 colloquial terms referring to
emotions can be found in the English language (Plutchik 2003, 64–8). These range from
‘anger’ and ‘anxiety’ to ‘indifference’ and ‘interest’ as well as to ‘self-respect’, ‘shame’
and ‘surprise’. Also, philosophers have compiled various systematically organized
‘dictionaries’ of emotions. Descartes’ list in The Passions of the Soul (Descartes [1649],
§§53–67) is a prominent example. More recently, Robert Solomon presented an
Emotional register – Who’s who among the passions with descriptions covering about
fifty emotion terms (Solomon 1993a, ch. 8). Any such list faces the problem of what
terms exactly deserve to be included, and the apparent diversity of phenomena classified
as emotions raises the question of whether all emotions may be claimed to have
epistemic relevance or only those of a certain type.
Attempts at structuring the universe of emotions include taxonomies along
dimensions such as intensity (Plutchik 1980, 157–60), backward-looking and forward-
looking, positive and negative (Lyons 1980, 89–91; Gordon 1987, 25–32; Prinz 2004b,
ch. 7), as well as outer and inner direction (Solomon 1993a, ch. 8). Other ways of
organizing the realm of emotions draw on designating certain emotions as ‘basic’,
though this is an ambiguous attribute of emotions (see Ortony and Turner 1990;
Plutchik 2003, ch. 4). One influential idea is to take some emotions as basic in the sense
of ‘elementary’ and explain the others as derivations, mixtures or compounds thereof, in
analogy to primary and secondary colours or chemical elements and compounds. There
is a long history of attempts at such a reduction including some well-known
philosophical proposals such as Descartes’ list of passions primitives: wonder, hatred,
joy, desire, love, sadness (Descartes [1649], §69). In cognitive science, Robert
Plutchik’s account (Plutchik 1980) is a paradigm of such a position. Alternatives to
elementary emotions include the view that the emotions form a multidimensional
spectrum which is structured by components that are not emotions themselves (Ortony
and Turner 1990). Equally common is the use of ‘basic’ in the sense of ‘pan-cultural’.
Empirical investigations in psychology suggest that some emotions can be found in all
cultures and have expressions that can be cross-culturally recognized (e.g. Ekman
1999b). This has been treated as evidence for their being relatively basic from a
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biological, specifically evolutionary perspective. In particular, these findings have been
put forward as a challenge to the rival stance that emotions are social constructions (cf.
Prinz 2004c). A classical list of pan-cultural emotions are the ‘big six’: anger, fear,
happiness, sadness, disgust, surprise (Ekman et al. 1969).3
Notable Distinctions
One reason why ‘emotion’ covers such a remarkable diversity of phenomena is that this
term itself is used with a range of different meanings. In modern philosophical
terminology, ‘emotion’, the older terms ‘passion’ and ‘affect’, as well as related
adjectives are used in a great variety of ways, sometimes with contrasting meanings,
sometimes as synonyms.4 The same holds for everyday language, which additionally
tends to use ‘feeling’ interchangeably with ‘emotion’. In theoretical writings, there is a
discernible tendency to distinguish between emotions, feelings and moods.
Furthermore, ‘affective’ tends to be used in a broad sense, including but not confined to
emotions and feelings, but covering, for instance, moods as well (cf. Davidson et al.
2003, xiii; Griffiths 2004b, 240–43).5 Nevertheless, these are trends, not rules. One
always has to be prepared to find divergent uses of ‘emotion’, ‘affective’ and the like, as
well as distinctions drawn differently from what is suggested here.
Non-English usage of ‘emotion’ is an additional source of confusion because
superficially similar terminology may cover up differences in meaning (see Cassin
2004). In German, for example, ‘Emotion’ has fairly recently been adopted from
English and French and has started to replace more traditional terms such as ‘Affekt’ or
‘Gemütsbewegung’. Often, but by no means always, it is used as a synonym for
‘Gefühl’, which in turn is not only the standard translation for ‘feeling’ but also used to
cover emotions.
Two distinctions are particularly useful in any discussion of the epistemic
relevance of emotions, since they help to avoid some misunderstandings and confusions
that are caused by the variety of terminologies in use.6 First, if an emotion is ascribed to
somebody, what does the emotion term refer to? This question calls for distinguishing
dispositions, processes, episodes and states. The second distinction concerns contrasting
uses of ‘emotion’, ‘feeling’ and ‘mood’, where feelings can be seen as an aspect of
emotions among others.
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To begin with, there are dispositional and non-dispositional uses of emotion terms
(Lyons 1980, 53–6). When we say
(1) Toby has a fear of flying.
we may want to say that it is a characteristic of Toby that he fears flying; that is, we
ascribe to him a disposition to an emotion. If this is the case ‘S has e’ can be interpreted
as a shorthand for ‘S is disposed to have e’ or ‘S is the e type of person’.7 Such a reading
of (1) is appropriate in a context like:
(2) Don’t even ask him to join you on this trip. He has a fear of flying.
Alternatively, we may use (1) to talk about an emotion actually affecting Toby
(sometimes called an ‘occurrent’ emotion):
(3) The trip to Hawaii was a nightmare for Toby because, suddenly, he had a
fear of flying.
In this case, ‘S has e’ means the same as ‘S is affected by e’. The difference between
these two usages makes it possible to say something like
(4) Toby’s fear of flying has saved him from actually experiencing his fear
of flying.
without contradicting oneself.
Additionally, this latter use of emotion terms can be further differentiated.
Expressions that refer to an emotion affecting somebody can in fact refer to a great
variety of emotional or emotion related phenomena. There are two relevant dimensions
here. On the one hand, emotions have the character of a process. They develop over
time, showing a pattern of changing features (Frijda 1993, 382; Goldie 2000, 12–14).
This renders emotion terms applicable to anything from long term processes lasting for
hours or months to episodes of short duration, in the limiting case even states with
almost no discernible pattern of evolution (cf. Solomon 2003, 2). For example:
(5) The trip to Hawaii was a nightmare for Toby, for he started having his
fear of flying the very day I suggested the trip to him.
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(6) Everything went well, until Toby suddenly had another rush of his fear of
flying in the middle of our flight.
On the other hand, having an emotion can include a great many elements or
aspects such as feelings, behaviour, bodily conditions and dispositions, including
dispositions to certain emotions:
(7) Irritated by his fear of flying, Toby was always on the verge of getting
angry with the cabin crew.
Many expressions can be used for referring to an emotion as a whole as well as for
picking out one, or a few, of all aspects of an emotion. Often the aspect referred to is a
feeling:
(8) As soon as we started, Toby’s fear of flying got even more intense.
Behind this distinction between emotions and feelings lurk important problems
concerning the nature of emotions. For there are theories of emotions which claim that
emotions essentially are feelings, while others reject such an identification or insist on
them being conceptually or factually independent. ‘Feeling’ and the verb ‘to feel’ are
themselves used in a wide variety of ways in everyday language. Sometimes they are
obviously closely related to emotions, as in ‘I feel angry at him’. For other uses, the
relations to emotions are less obvious, as in ‘I feel like having a bath’, ‘I feel hungry’, ‘I
cannot feel the vibrations you are talking about’, ‘I feel you should not interfere’ and so
on (cf. Alston 1967, 483; Kenny [1963], 36–7). In philosophy, the majority of writers
use ‘feeling’ to refer to some quality of consciousness; that is, to some state of
awareness, to be described, if possible, in phenomenological terms, similar to the qualia
of perception.8 On-going disputes concern the question of what it is that is sensed in a
feeling, the relation of feelings to bodily conditions and to behaviour, as well as the
questions of whether feelings are accessible by introspection alone and whether they are
intentional (cf. Goldie 2000, ch. 3).
Finally, there is ‘mood’, a third term which is used in close connection with
emotions:
(9) Ever since Toby flew to Hawaii, he has been a bit down.
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A widely accepted psychological definition holds that moods are diffuse, global, low
intensity emotions of longer duration (Oatley et al. 2006, 30). Against this it has been
quite convincingly argued that the most salient difference between emotions and moods
is not their duration or intensity, but the fact that moods do not have a specific
intentional object (e.g. Frijda 1993; Goldie 2000, 143–51; Prinz 2004b, 182–8; for
sceptical remarks see Plutchik 2003, 63). Emotions, so the argument goes, can be
described as intentional affective states, oriented towards rather specific objects. The
target of an outburst of anger, for instance, may be a certain word one believes to have
overheard. Moods, on the other hand, either lack intentionality altogether or they are
non-specifically oriented towards, for example, ‘everything’, ‘nothing’ or ‘the world’.
In short, moods are emotions without specific objects, the difference being gradual
rather than categorical (Goldie 2000, 17).
To sum up, as emotion terminology is anything but uniform, statements about
emotions are often ambiguous. They admit of disposition-to- and affected-by-readings,
or of being interpreted as referring to emotional processes of different ‘sizes’ or to some
aspect of an emotion, such as a feeling or a bodily condition. Furthermore, we may
expect that these distinctions will prove important for claims about the epistemic
significance of emotions.
Characteristics of Emotions and Theories of Emotions
Emotional processes are studied from a wide range of perspectives.9 Consequently,
theories of emotions have drawn attention to many different aspects of emotions,
relating to sensation, cognition and action, to the body and its environment. The result is
that the discussion about the nature of emotions refers to a bewildering variety of
characteristics. These include feelings, behaviour (e.g. facial or gestural expressions),
bodily reactions (e.g. muscle tone or neurological processes), cognitions, dispositions to
act (e.g. to fight or explore) and to more emotions. But emotions are also associated
with causes and intentionality; that is to say, emotions are directed towards something
else (an object, event, state of mind, disposition, proposition etc.), which can be
identical to their cause or different from it (e.g. a future event may be the object of my
hope or fear, but not its cause; Kenny [1963], 49–52; Gordon 1987). Furthermore,
emotions are held to include or presuppose certain evaluations, beliefs or other
DR
AF
T
cognitions. They can be analysed with respect to their narrative structure, their being
embedded in society and culture, as well as with respect to the question of whether they
merit being assessed as appropriate, justified, rational, reasonable, intelligible or
warranted.
As Jesse Prinz (2004b, ch. 1) has pointed out, this multiplicity of features
confronts theories of emotions with a ‘problem of parts’ as well as a ‘problem of
plenty’. On the one hand, the various aspects of emotions must be accounted for; on the
other hand, it must be explained how they integrate into emotions. Consequently,
different theories of emotions not only distinguish different features of emotions, they
also assign different functions to those features, interpreting them as aspects, parts,
preconditions, causes or effects of emotions. Moreover, the same feature may be taken
as important or even essential to all or some emotions by one theory, but largely
ignored, declared irrelevant or even non-existent by another. Some theories try to reduce
emotions to some of these features. William James, for example, suggested in his
influential What Is an Emotion? (James 1884; cf. James [1890], 442–67) that
consciously felt emotions just are sensations of physiological disturbances directly
caused by perceptions. Other theories try to integrate different aspects (e.g. ‘affect
programs’ as introduced in Ekman 1977) or take ‘emotion’ to be a family resemblance
concept (e.g. Alston 1967).
In our epistemological context, two questions about theories of emotions are of
special relevance: Are emotions cognitive? And is a uniform theory of the emotions
needed for assessing the epistemological status of emotions?
Firstly, the discussion of whether emotions are cognitive is partly fuelled by
divergent and unclear uses of ‘cognitive’ (see Solomon 2003; Prinz 2004b, ch. 2). A
rather restrictive interpretation of ‘cognitive’ requires that theories of emotions count as
cognitive only if they attribute propositional content to emotions. On such accounts,
emotions are typically assimilated to beliefs or normative judgements. Claims along
these lines can be found in the theories of, for example, Solomon (1993a, ch. 5.3; but cf.
Solomon 2003 and 2007, ch. 18), William Lyons (1980, 71–7) and Martha Nussbaum
(2001, ch. I.1).
More liberal interpretations of ‘cognitive’ additionally include theories that
construe emotions on the model of perception. Such an analysis of emotions has already
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been present in de Sousa’s influential study The Rationality of Emotion (1987; cf. de
Sousa 2004). It is currently defended by several authors, Sabine Döring (this vol.), Elgin
(1996; this vol.) and Prinz (2004b).10 As a minimal definition of cognitive theories of
emotions, one may count all theories as cognitive which include the claim that emotions
are intentional (Döring 2003, 225–6; this vol.). According to this criterion, strictly
behaviouristic theories and theories that reduce emotions to feelings are not cognitive.
There are two ways in which an emotion can be said to be intentional or oriented
towards an object. (Kenny [1963], 131–5) On the one hand, an emotion has a ‘formal’
object such as being dangerous in the case of fear11 or being disgusting in the case of
disgust. In de Sousa’s characterization, the formal object of an attitude is ‘that which
gives the trivial answer to the question Why do you hold this attitude?’ (de Sousa 2007,
5; cf. de Sousa 1987, 121–3). More specifically, the formal object of an emotion can be
defined as the property x must have, or the norm x must comply with, if the emotion in
question is to be appropriate or at least intelligible with respect to x. On the other hand,
a specific emotional episode is oriented to something particular, the ‘material’ or
‘particular’ object, which at least seemingly fits the formal object. The formal object of
surprise, for example, is being unexpected, while the particular object of your surprise
may be a long lost key found in one of your shoes. Intentionality in this sense of formal
and particular objects is not just intentionality in the sense that emotions relate to some
bodily conditions (Goldie 2004, 93). To say that disgust presents the body as being in a
state of disgust is to miss the point of this emotion, which rather consists in presenting
some object or situation as disgusting. For this reason, accounts which simply identify
emotions with awareness of bodily changes do not count as intentional.12
As an alternative to a general cognitive theory of emotions, one may defend the
more restricted view that certain emotions are specifically cognitive in one of the senses
explained. This issue will be discussed in the final section.
A second debate revolves around the charge that philosophical theories of
emotions rely on the invalid assumption that it is possible to develop a uniform theory
of the emotions. Several writers, notably Amélie Rorty and Paul Griffiths, have claimed
that the emotions do not constitute a natural kind (Rorty 1980b; Rorty 2004; Griffiths
1997; Griffiths 2004a; Griffiths 2004b). Rorty argues that there is no clear distinction
between emotions and other mental states such as motives, moods and attitudes.
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Consequently, she emphasizes that philosophical accounts of emotions should be
integrated into a comprehensive framework of a philosophy of mind (see also Solomon
2004a, 84). Griffiths claims that the diversity of phenomena called ‘emotions’ does not
allow for a unified scientific account; that is, the category of emotions cannot be used to
reliably derive the inductive generalizations that biology, neuroscience and psychology
need for explaining the mechanisms underlying emotions. Even what appears to name a
single type of emotion, for example ‘anger’, may collect diverse phenomena, ranging
from an instinct-like ‘affect program’ to a voluntarily adopted strategic behaviour.13
Many philosophers have resisted this analysis, objecting that the emotions do have
a lot in common (even if not with respect to biological mechanisms), that the
taxonomies of the vernacular should be respected, and that Griffiths’s arguments rely on
too narrow a conception of what theories of emotion should aim at explaining (see e.g.
Prinz 2004b, ch. 4; Roberts 2003, ch. 1.4). At any rate, even if philosophical analysis
starts with vernacular concepts, it would be a misunderstanding to conclude that it is
thereby confined to simply accepting these concepts. Philosophy, no less than the
sciences, relies on the method of explication, which aims less at finding extensional
equivalents than at replacing vernacular concepts for the sake of precision, simplicity
and fruitful theories (cf. Carnap 1962, §§2–3). For the question about epistemological
significance of emotions, we may draw the consequence that it could be a serious
strategic error to presuppose that all emotions can be treated the same in this respect.
Rather, one should be prepared to find that certain emotions fulfil some epistemic
functions – perhaps only under certain circumstances – whereas other emotions are
unsuitable for these functions, or are altogether irrelevant from an epistemological point
of view.
3. Emotions in Epistemology
Emotion’s Bad Reputation in Epistemology
Most epistemologists have not given positive accounts of emotions. This is part of an
attitude that holds that ‘reason should be the master of passion’14. Its roots can be traced
back to ancient Greece, where Democritus, for example, stated: ‘Medicine cures
diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from emotions’ (Diels 1951–52, 68 B 31;
transl. in Sorabji 2000, 2). Such maxims have served as a guide not only for practical
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decision making, but also for cognitive activities. The distinction on which they depend
remains in place when they are turned upside down, as most famously in Hume’s
declaration that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions (Hume [1739/40],
II.iii.3, 415).
In any case, the metaphor of master and slave is more ambiguous than one may
first think. If reason is the master then the emotions are servants. Servants are generally
kept because they do something useful, they sometimes have abilities their masters lack,
and many a master would be rather lost without them. The metaphor of master and
servant, together with the metaphorical mind vs. heart categorization of practical
decisions, is embedded in a pre-theoretic cultural tradition of treating reasons and
emotions as opposing one another.15 In the philosophical tradition, the contrast between
reason and emotion is closely related to various doctrines about the different faculties of
the soul. However, irrespective of their position in various theories of the mind, and
notwithstanding Hume’s famous dictum, the reputation of emotions in epistemology
tended to be unfavourable throughout the history of philosophy. There are a number of
reasons for this traditionally prevalent negative assessment of emotions.
To start with, emotions have long been recognized as threats to rational and
epistemic decision making. They can impair processes of knowledge acquisition or the
assessment of knowledge claims. The most straightforward version of such a view,
usually attributed to the Stoics, holds that emotions simply are misguided judgements
(see Sorabji 2000, 55). Independently from such an identification, emotions have been
charged with distorting perception, as well as leading to wishful thinking and self-
deception. Explanations of such phenomena often rely on tying emotions to the will or
to desires. Emotions are then criticized for being a means by which will or desire can
‘take over’ reason or perception, or disrupt a rational process. To guard oneself against
such influences, emotions either have to be mastered (as recommended, for example, by
the Stoics) or one has to strive for having the ‘right’ emotions (as Aristotle argued). In
this volume (p. 000), Peter Goldie takes a closer look at how emotions can ‘skew the
epistemic landscape’, especially when triggered in environments that are different from
those they have evolved in (see also Wild, this vol.).
A second concern is that emotions do not contribute to knowledge because they
are too subjective or private to be relevant to what should ultimately be the objective
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truth of beliefs, independently of how exactly ‘objective’ and ‘truth’ are understood. If,
for example, two people spot an animal and one of them believes it to be a wolf while
the other sees a dog, there is a fact that decides who is right. However, if somebody
experiences fear when coming across a dog, then this emotion indicates the presence of
something frightening, but this is so only for that person. It neither follows that the
animal should be experienced similarly by other people, nor that they should consider it
to be frightening.
Thirdly, even if it is commonly conceded that there are emotions which are
obviously linked to cognition by motivating and regulating cognitive activities, this
motivational force is often dismissed as epistemologically irrelevant. Wonder, which
comes first on Descartes’ list of basic emotions (Descartes [1649], §69), is a case in
point; it may motivate us to acquire a belief, but does not enter into epistemic evaluation
of the belief. Typically, such arguments hinge on a distinction between the validity of
beliefs and theories, and the history of their formation, which is thought to be
epistemologically irrelevant. This issue will be discussed in section 4.
Similar considerations are brought to bear on those emotions which involve an
evaluation of a propositional content with respect to some cognitive standard. A feeling
that something is the case and similar emotions are not sources of knowledge, because
their affective attitudinal aspect as such does not contribute to the justification of the
embedded belief. Feeling that something is the case fares no better than acts of guessing
or instances of clairvoyance (see Dohrn, this vol.).
The Trend Towards a Rehabilitation
Several points have been instrumental in the recent reassessment of emotions as
candidates for epistemic functions. First of all, emotions can be and often are evaluated
as rational or appropriate. There is currently a discussion on whether the
appropriateness of emotions may be interpreted as emotional truth (see e.g. de Sousa
2002; Salmela 2006). Either way, this undermines the view that they necessarily
misguide or distort cognition. Rather, one would expect that they only do so if they are
irrational or inappropriate. Instead of dismissing emotions as intrinsically interfering
with knowledge acquisition, we should specify the conditions under which they
contribute to knowledge. Secondly, there are reasons to doubt the claim that the privacy
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and alleged subjectivity of emotions render them epistemically useless (Goldie 2004,
94–5; Solomon 2007, 150–58). In this respect the analogy between emotion and
perception plays an important role (see de Sousa 1987, 145–58; Deonna 2006).
Finally, the renewed interest in the emotions has led to a whole range of
philosophical theories of the emotions. Most of these theories hold that emotions
include a cognitive element, which means that they are directed toward the world and
can be evaluated accordingly. Such cognitive functions call for epistemological
analysis, which in turn may lead to an epistemological reassessment of emotions.
Despite the recent trend to give emotions a more favourable place in
epistemology, theories vary enormously with respect to the actual functions they assign
to emotions, with respect to the kinds of emotions they give such functions to and with
respect to the epistemological consequences they draw. Some conceive of themselves as
still compatible with traditional positions in epistemology, invoking emotions, for
example, to underwrite relevant alternative accounts of reliability. Others depart from
traditional conceptions of epistemology and opt for emotions’ cognitive significance in
the context of a more or less drastic redesign of epistemology (Elgin, this vol.). In what
follows, we look at the most frequently mentioned candidates for epistemologically
relevant features and functions of emotions. These are motivational force, salience and
relevance, epistemic access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to
knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency.
Motivational Force
That emotions motivate cognitive activities can hardly be doubted. There is an
abundance of anecdotal evidence of researchers describing themselves as motivated by
emotions when they tell their stories outside the academic journals (cf. the case-study in
Thagard 2002). Examples of motivating emotions include surprise, interest, doubt and
puzzlement sparking inquiry, pride in standards of research, frustration and
disappointment with the results achieved.16 It has been argued that precisely emotions’
disruptive character, so often treated as evidence for their supposed irrationality, makes
them important, perhaps even indispensable for cognition. Emotions kick in when we
are cognitively challenged, when our knowledge seems false, inadequate, irrelevant or
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not useful. Emotions are mechanisms that make us learn something (Oatley 1999, 274–
5).17
Emotions can motivate not only further research within some accepted framework
and according to shared and accepted standards, but also critical reflection on such
frameworks or standards. In this way, the disappointing outcome of some experiment
may not just motivate the scientist to repeat the experiment or to redesign it, but also to
doubt the reliability of his instruments or to envisage theoretical revisions. In some
cases, researchers may also be led to question the standards determining what counts as,
for example, an established result or a reliable replication. Hookway argues that doubt,
especially if assimilated to anxiety, can be counted as an emotion that motivates critical
reflection of the reliability of results and standards of epistemic evaluation (Hookway
1998; Hookway 2000; Hookway, this vol.; Dohrn, this vol.).
While there is no doubt that inquirers sometimes are motivated by emotions, the
question is whether the inquirer’s motivation is epistemologically relevant.
Considerations relying on a distinction between contexts of discovery and justification
suggest a negative answer. However, one way of arguing to the contrary hinges on a
shift of epistemological attention from the pursued result to the pursuit itself; that is,
from knowledge and/or true belief to epistemic activities and cognitive agents. As
mentioned in section 1, both Elgin (1996) and Hookway (1990; 2000) defend such a
move. Consequently, justification of beliefs may be conceived as dependent on the
history of their acquisition (Elgin 1996, 121–2). And since beliefs have to be evaluated
in relation to cognitive actions, their evaluation may also depend on the identity and
properties of desires, goals, mechanisms, motivations and virtues. Because emotions
with motivating force can themselves be normatively assessed in many ways (‘How
unreasonable to be disappointed and continue to do all these nightly experiments.’),
appropriate motivating emotions could become available for constitutive accounts of
justified beliefs. Including motivating emotions in justifications of beliefs is not far
from, and is sometimes seen as related to, the account of justified beliefs that some
virtue epistemologists tend to give (cf. Fairweather 2001).
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Salience and Relevance
Emotions’ potential function as a source of salience and relevance has been emphasized
by de Sousa in his influential thesis that ‘emotions are determinate patterns of salience
among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies.’ (de Sousa
[1979], 137; de Sousa, this vol.; Lance and Tanesini 2004; Hookway, this vol.) This
thesis has been applied to a well-known problem in decision theory (de Sousa 1987,
190–96).18 In the standard model of rational choice, an ideal agent faces a combinatorial
explosion because for each of the unlimited number of possible actions open to her at a
given time there is an unlimited number of consequences to be taken into account. Real
agents with limited resources to spend on a decision must therefore limit the number of
actions and consequences to be considered if they ever want to reach a decision. The
standard methods of rational choice cannot be used for accomplishing this reduction,
because they would only reintroduce the combinatorial problem for every consequence
of every action when the agent must decide on whether she should include this action in
her reasoning about the decision she set out to take in the first place. According to de
Sousa’s argument, emotions, by functioning as sources of salience, effect the necessary
narrowing down of the number of actions and consequences. Guilt, for example, may be
an emotion that helps selecting strategies of social interaction by drawing attention to
possible dangers of non-cooperative behaviour (Ketelaar and Todd 2001, 200–203).
As a first approximation, for emotions to be sources of salience means that they
establish a focus on certain aspects of a situation, they act as ‘spotlights’ (Peters 2006,
458). However, as Elgin has emphasized, emotions establish salience in highly complex
ways that are not limited to simply putting some properties of a situation into the
foreground. An emotion is ‘a frame of mind or pattern of attention that synchronizes
feelings, attitudes, actions, and circumstances’ (Elgin 1996, 148). Like beliefs, emotions
cannot be reduced to an attitude towards a proposition or situation, but comprise
attitudes to other situations, commitments to categories being appropriate for classifying
aspects of the actual and alternative situations, acceptance of standards for the
evaluation of and dispositions to act, believe or feel in such situations. (Elgin 1996, 153;
Elgin, this vol.) An unnerved neighbour, for example, may perceive a child’s crying as
nothing but loud and piercing, whereas the child’s dismayed parents hear signs of some
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specific kind of distress, say pain, drawing their attention to possible causes and ways of
bringing relief (see Elgin 1996, 153–4).
Just as with motivation, salience and relevance come into focus once we see
epistemology as primarily dealing with cognitive activities, as opposed to properties of
belief systems. As sources of salience and relevance, emotions are themselves
evaluations. To consider something to be relevant or salient with respect to some goal
and context of inquiry is to evaluate it; namely as something that ought to be considered
further. Moreover, emotions fulfilling this function can be evaluated, for we can
wrongly find something salient or relevant.
Additionally, salience can (but need not) be seen as an instance of epistemic
immediacy. We often struggle to find out why we find something salient, and whether
and why we are right to do so. Sometimes, at least, this happens because our epistemic
evaluation of salience is either not governed by rules or governed by rules that we
cannot articulate (Hookway, this vol.; see the remarks on Goodman’s grue paradox p.
000).
Finally, relevance has been taken seriously by epistemologists who support
relevant alternative accounts of knowledge. According to such theories, we would deny
that a subject knows that she is looking at, say, a robin if she could not visually
distinguish this situation from an alternative in which she is looking at some other bird
(e.g. Dretske 1970; Goldman 1976; Goldman 1986). Some possible situations however,
including sceptically threatening brains-in-vats scenarios, need not be ruled out – they
are irrelevant to assessing the knowledge claim in question (e.g. Goldman 1976, 775).
The strategy thus requires a distinction between relevant and irrelevant alternative
scenarios, which may be established by emotions, for example by some difference
between real, felt doubts and mere philosophical paper doubts. We may just need
confidence in our ability to focus on relevant alternatives (see Hookway 2003b, 190–
91).
Epistemic Access to Facts and Beliefs
A third way of attributing epistemological significance to emotions is based on the
claim that emotions are an additional source of knowledge (alongside reason,
perception, intuition, testimony). This thought can be fleshed out in two ways, although
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they are not always easy to keep apart in the literature. The strong version holds that
emotions provide epistemic access to otherwise inaccessible facts. Weaker varieties
claim that while emotions can be sources of true beliefs, they are not indispensable.
As Elgin observes (1996, 164–5; this vol.), emotions provide epistemic access to
certain response-dependent properties that are directly tied to emotions. The properties
of being amusing, depressing or disgusting may serve as examples. Response-dependent
properties are typically, but not exclusively, part of discussions of secondary qualities.
Their defining feature is that whether a given object has the property in question must
be decided with reference to our responses to that object. Some of the properties that
lend themselves to analysis as response-dependent are dependent on differing emotional
responses. There is a sense in which for something to be disgusting, for example, is for
us (or at least some of us) to respond to it by finding it disgusting. It is highly plausible
that, in the right circumstances, emotions can disclose such response-dependent
properties.
Moreover, emotions are said to provide access to facts more generally (e.g. Goldie
2004, 94–9). Typically, emotions are not only reactions to stimuli, but are intertwined
with beliefs that may relate to many aspects of a given situation. They are, generally
speaking, ‘sensitive to information’ (Elgin 1996, 156). The result is that emotions
provide complex patterns of attitudes, feelings, expectations and dispositions which
correlate to complex nets of features of actual and possible situations. This is the basis
for ‘exploiting’ emotions as cues for facts which are in some way or other related to the
occurrence of the respective emotion.
While these points support the claim that emotions can provide access to certain
facts, it is not obvious that they also support the strong claim that there are facts that are
epistemically accessible only through emotions. As an example, we may look at
response-dependent properties such as amusing and disgusting, which are plausible
candidates for the strong claim. For the sake of the argument, we may put aside
questions related to the criteria of correct application of such predicates. We can, for
example, simply think of a new predicate ‘minimally disgusting’ defined as applying to
anything at least one person finds disgusting. If Jacques, for example, finds immature
cheese disgusting, then the proposition that immature cheese is minimally disgusting
can be justified by appeal to his emotion, and indeed it must be justified by appeal to
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somebody’s emotion. However, this does not amount to a proof of the strong claim.
Although the fact that something is minimally disgusting is by definition constituted by
somebody’s emotional response, this does not imply that one cannot know about it
without having certain emotions. Perhaps Jacques’s disgust can be reliably read off his
facial expressions, which reliably express his emotion.
A more convincing case for the strong claim may be made with reference to
emotions that provide epistemic access to one’s own propositional attitudes and
commitments (perhaps even beliefs, if we allow for subjects’ having beliefs without
being aware of them). By ‘behaving’ emotionally the way one happens to do, one can
make discoveries about the beliefs, expectations or standards one implicitly endorses.
This may often be the only way to find out about a certain commitment. However, such
discoveries presuppose that one knows about one’s emotions. The fact that somebody’s
behaviour disappoints me can be my sole clue for discovering that I had certain
expectations towards this person’s behaviour, which in turn can imply that I am
committed to certain standards of behaviour or to beliefs about the person or situation
(cf. Elgin 1996, 159–61; Elster 1996, 1393–4).
The view that emotions are sources of beliefs is particularly attractive in the
context of cognitive theories of emotions, which hold that emotions embed beliefs or
other propositional contents. A paradigmatic example is Aristotle’s analysis of anger as
‘a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the
hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one’s friends’ (Aristotle Rhetoric,
1378a31–33). On this account, being angry presupposes believing quite a few things:
that a slight occurred, that it was unjustified and so on. Although belief-centred
cognitive theories have proved difficult to defend as general theories of emotions, it is
still possible to defend the view that some emotions are essentially tied to types of
propositional content. The question is whether such emotionally accessed beliefs are not
of just the same epistemological interest that beliefs in general are. Emotionally
‘embedded’ propositions can be true or false, and believing them can be justified or
unjustified, just like any other propositional content or belief.
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Non-propositional Contributions to Knowledge and Understanding
As mentioned in section 1, there have been attempts to widen traditional epistemology’s
focus from propositional knowledge to a broader conception of understanding that
includes non-propositional contributions, skills and methods. Emotions have been
claimed to contribute significantly to the formation of categories and cognitive
organization, as well as standards of inquiry and warrant.
The central aspect of cognitive organization is a system of categories or concepts
used for classification. Any epistemological theory that deals with propositions and
concepts will acknowledge that the content of propositional attitudes depends, among
other things, on conceptual content. Hence the content of Anna’s belief that the stone
she bought is obsidian depends on the concept obsidian, as used by herself or by the
person that attributes this belief to her. The involvement of categories in belief is also a
crucial point in theoretical debates, such as the one between epistemological
foundationalism and coherentism (e.g. BonJour 1985, ch. 2.3). Concepts and categories
can themselves be evaluated. It is, for example, not difficult to think of stupid or
fruitless ways of dividing the animal kingdom, as exemplified in Borges’ story ‘The
Analytical Language of John Wilkins’ (Borges [1942]). Consequently, one may claim
that categories are themselves subject to justification in relation to some given epistemic
end or general epistemic considerations. Elgin, for example, holds that for categories to
be justified is for them to ‘fit’ into a constellation of ‘tenable commitments to promote
tenable ends’; that is, to be part of a consistent and systematic system of beliefs,
commitments, standards and methods that is tethered in pre-theoretic commitments
(Elgin 1996, 104–5).
Similarly to the view that salience ought to be understood in affective terms, it
may be argued that the application of new categories, the abandonment of pointless
categories, the re-activation of dormant categories and the revision of existing
categories are best tied to emotions. There are two ways in which emotions may affect
classifications (Elgin 1996, 161–9). Emotional responses constitutive of response-
dependent properties (e.g., amusing, interesting, boring, disgusting) are examples of
emotions that straightforwardly affect conceptual organization. In this case, emotions
we accept as appropriate determine what is covered by certain concepts. In a second
family of cases, appropriate responses are not criteria for the applicability of a given
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predicate, but criteria for the appropriateness of a category, as is obviously the case with
certain moral categories. If two situations strike us in the same way as being, say,
outrageous, this can count as evidence against a proposed system of classes and its
standards if that would compel us to classify them as opposites from a moral point of
view (e.g. the same behaviour is good or bad just because it is a man’s or a woman’s
behaviour respectively); and similarly the other way around.
Hookway applies the idea that emotions can be invoked in order to justify
preferences for some categories or concepts to Goodman’s ‘grue’ paradox (Goodman
1983, 74). Quine suggests that we ought to prefer the green-hypothesis, because we
somehow feel that this is simpler (Quine 1960, 19). The crucial claim is that such a
choice is epistemically immediate insofar as it would be mistaken to put epistemic
subjects under the obligation to justify such a choice by, for example, articulating the
rules they follow; that is, the principles of induction and projection they rely upon. If
one accepts that simplicity is, at least sometimes, just felt, then such a feeling of
simplicity also exemplifies how emotions may be said to embed epistemic standards
that may not be applicable in other, rule-based ways. More precisely, emotions can
reflect evaluations that rely on standards which are not directly accessible to reflection.
Consequently, attempts to uncover such standards must rely on methods that explore
our emotions for evaluative patterns, such as thought experiments. Hookway concludes:
‘We can formulate our evaluative standards only as a result of a search for an
explanation of our habits of evaluation.’ (Hookway 2002, 253)
At least with respect to certain standards, such as validity of basic patterns of
inference, one may want to go one step further and claim that they must be
reconstructed as principles that explain patterns of emotional reactions. Although this
does not imply that emotions justify these standards, it amounts to claiming that some
standards are accessible via emotions only (de Sousa 1998).
In line with Quine’s naturalistic stance, such claims may get support from a more
biologist point of view. Paul Thagard, for example, has presented a theory of coherence
which includes emotional aspects in such a way that one can interpret it as the
hypothesis that judgements about coherence are connected to emotional reactions on a
neurological level (Thagard 2000, 211–13; Thagard 2002, 245–7; Thagard, this vol.).
This boils down to the claim that there is a causal connection between coherence and
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some emotions, for conceptual and emotional coherence are associated on a biological
level. If we accept coherence as a crucial standard for assessing theories, we can argue
that such causal connections warrant the claim that aesthetic emotions sometimes are
relevant to the evaluation of a theory. They can be interpreted as indicators of
(in)coherence and, if conscious, as perceptions of (in)coherence.
Epistemic Efficiency
There are two ways of claiming epistemological significance for emotion’s
contributions to cognitive efficiency. The first and weaker claim is that emotions make
it easier to perform things that could also be done in their absence. This claim is hardly
controversial, but even if it is true that emotions are merely heuristic devices that are in
principle dispensable, it is unclear whether we have to take emotions seriously when
engaging in responsible epistemic evaluation (Hookway 2003a, 80).
According to the stronger and more controversial claim, there are important
cognitive functions which humans cannot perform successfully at all without relying on
the efficiency-enhancing quality of emotions. A candidate for the stronger claim is de
Sousa’s view that emotions make rational deliberation humanly possible by selecting
relevant information (p. 000). Furthermore, emotions could also be seen as bringing
sceptical challenges to a halt. They determine the point at which the demand for yet
another justification can be rejected, thereby blocking the threatening regress. Such
‘shallow reflection’-accounts (Hookway 2003a, 82) do not only claim that emotions
enhance epistemic efficiency, but also that without the help of emotions ‘excessive
reflection’ would block any inquiry right at the start (see Dohrn, this vol. for a critical
discussion).
Research in the context of recent discussions of emotional intelligence and
emotions’ cognitive functions has aimed at identifying evidence for claims along these
lines. Our ability to take rational decisions, in particular, seems to be severely limited
without emotions (e.g. Damasio [1994]). These findings primarily relate to practical
decisions, but it seems plausible that they also hold for theoretical decisions, insofar as
they, too, involve decisions to act in certain ways. For example, the question of whether
a certain experimental design can be considered valid is related to the decision whether
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the experiment can be carried out as designed or should be redesigned (see Goldie 2004,
98–9).
4. Two Focus Questions
As one would expect, the proposed positive contributions of emotions to epistemology
are contested far various reasons. In the following, we concentrate on two issues.
Firstly, the epistemological significance of emotions can perhaps be denied by invoking
the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification.
Secondly, we may suspect that epistemological relevance cannot be claimed for
emotions in general, but only for a subset of specifically epistemic emotions, and that
some of the mental states epistemologists have recently invoked as emotions are not
really emotions. We think that these issues implicitly shape a great deal of the
discussion on epistemology and emotions.
A Normative Perspective on Emotions
As pointed out in section 1, the field of epistemology has often been delineated with
reference to a distinction between context of discovery and context of justification.19 On
this basis, one may argue that emotions are just one of many epistemologically
irrelevant aspects of epistemic agents, practices, processes and states. They may be
important factors in actual processes of belief acquisition and revision, partly
determining what beliefs we arrive at and how much confidence we have in them, but
they do not play any role when it comes to epistemically assessing beliefs or cognitive
processes. Neither can we reasonably answer the question whether a belief counts as
knowledge by appealing to emotions, nor will the answer to this question depend on
whether emotions contributed to our getting to consider this belief as a candidate for
knowledge. In short, epistemologists deal with the question of what counts as
knowledge; it is not their job to find out, for example, about how efficient various
processes of belief formation are or about what motivations tend to advance or hinder
inquiry. Concerns along these lines are probably at work in many positions in the debate
on the potential epistemological significance of emotions. Within this volume, they are
explicitly addressed in the papers of Tanesini and Thagard.
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However, it is not at all clear what exactly the objection is, for the distinction
between the context of discovery and the context of justification is not as plain as it
might seem. As Paul Hoyningen-Huene has pointed out, it has been associated with at
least five different senses, which often have been conflated (Hoyningen-Huene 1987,
504–6; Hoyningen-Huene 2006, 119–23). Firstly, the distinction can be taken to
distinguish between two different types of historical processes, typically assumed to be
temporally distinct. Or, secondly, between actual historical processes of discovery and
considerations relevant to their justification; that is, between the factual and the
normative. Thirdly, between empirical study of a discovery, which may involve
historical, psychological and sociological research, and analysis or critical testing of
justification by logical means. Fourthly, between academic disciplines with respect to
their methodology; specifically, between epistemology and philosophy of science on the
one hand, history, psychology and sociology on the other. Finally, between two types of
questions.
According to Hoyningen-Huene’s analysis, some of these distinctions face serious
difficulties (especially the first one), but at the heart of the second to fifth version of the
distinction we can identify a difference between factual and normative perspectives and
questions (Hoyningen-Huene 1987, 511). When we examine cognitive agents, processes
and products, we can either ask what exactly they are, or we can ask whether they are
correct, good, rational, justified, etc. We can aim at accurate descriptions or at epistemic
(or other) evaluations.
This way of understanding the distinction has the advantage that different
questions can have the same answer, different perspectives can single out different
aspects of the same practice, process or state (Hoyningen-Huene 2006, 129).
Specifically, it would be fallacious to think that describing epistemic activities and
agents by appeal to emotions precludes the latter from being relevant to the epistemic
evaluation of the former. There is no reason why emotions should not feature in answers
to both normative and empirical questions. Epistemic states as well as processes, agents
and practices can all be examined from both factual and normative perspectives. Of
course, we may look at processes of belief formation when epistemically evaluating
beliefs or theories. In fact, this is just what causal, reliabilist and virtue theorists of
epistemic justification do. For a belief to be epistemically justified is, according to those
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views, for it to be caused in the right way, to be produced by mechanisms with certain
properties or to be formed by applying certain virtues. Clearly, such accounts take a
normative perspective, for they attempt to spell out the conditions that determine
whether something can be evaluated as epistemically justified.
Nonetheless, it is possible to appeal to the context distinction as a way of stressing
that epistemological questions are evaluative, not descriptive. But of course, advocates
of emotions in epistemology may defend the normative character of epistemology as
well. Elgin, for example, is explicitly committed to doing so (Elgin 1996, 5–6).
Consequently, the real disagreement concerns the question whether emotions matter at
all in evaluating knowledge claims or only in various descriptions of cognitive agents
and activities. But defending the normative significance of emotions is not enough. For
emotions to be epistemologically significant, they must not only be significant from a
normative perspective, but from a specifically epistemic (as opposed to moral, practical,
aesthetic) perspective. Critiques of emotions in epistemology may admit that emotions
play an important role in living up to certain norms, but argue that these norms are
epistemically irrelevant by pointing out that they are independent of epistemic ends,
which are typically identified as truth and truth-conducive justification. Such a charge
against, for example, the claim that cognitive efficiency is epistemically significant can
be countered in various ways. One may defend that more efficiently arrived at beliefs
are more likely to be true, that efficiency is suitably related to some other epistemic end
or maybe that efficiency itself is an epistemic end.
Epistemic Emotions
The second issue concerns the nature of some of the states or dispositions
epistemologists appeal to under the heading ‘emotions’. It is not always clear that
arguments for epistemological reappraisal of emotions really amount to anything like a
general defence of the epistemological standing of emotions. To begin with, various
authors have claimed that there are emotions which are tied to specifically epistemic
contexts and thus have specifically epistemic character. Surprise is a paradigmatic case.
Israel Scheffler ([1977]), for example, defines as ‘cognitive emotions’ those emotions
which presuppose a claim that concerns the nature of the subject’s cognitions.
Especially interesting are cases where such a claim is epistemologically relevant to the
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cognitions it concerns. Surprise, for example, involves the ‘supposition that what has
happened conflicts with prior expectation’ (Scheffler [1977], 12). But Scheffler also
mentions joy of verification and disappointment or joy of falsification, echoing the
quote from Schlick in the introduction to this paper. Such emotions are
epistemologically significant since they embody epistemic standards. In a Peircean vein
Scheffler then goes on to point out that a certain receptivity to surprise is an attitude
which plays an important epistemic function shielding the inquirer from the ‘epistemic
apathy’ (Scheffler [1977], 13) of radical scepticism and radical credulity, as well as
from the inertia of dogmatism. We cannot hope to improve epistemically without
allowing ourselves to be surprised (see Hookway, this vol., on doubt and Tanesini, this
vol., on intellectual modesty).
On this base, one might object that even if epistemic emotions merit a place in
epistemology, this may not be the case for emotions in general. Perhaps epistemic
emotions are epistemologically relevant not insofar as they are emotions, but simply
because they are epistemic. In addition, such an objection implicitly suggests that the
whole case for the epistemological significance of emotions boils down to the truism
that the epistemic is epistemologically significant.
However, neither Scheffler nor the other advocates of emotions rest their case just
on arguments that are restricted to some narrowly defined class of epistemic emotions.
In this volume, de Sousa, for example, gives an overview of epistemic feelings based on
a double classification according to their object and the phase of inquiry in which they
can occur. This covers a wide range of phenomena from curiosity to certainty. But his
account is not restricted to such epistemic feelings. For he also argues that emotions in
general have epistemologically relevant aspects and consequently we should think of
the emotions as epistemologically relevant in various degrees. Hookway, too, despite
sometimes speaking of specifically epistemic emotions, often draws parallels between
epistemic evaluations and emotional responses in general (Hookway 1998; Hookway,
this vol.).
If we examine what states, dispositions and feelings have been invoked by
epistemologists, we find not only paradigmatic emotions such as fear (de Sousa, this
vol.; Elgin, this vol.) and anger (Thagard, this vol.), but also less straightforward
examples like experience of beauty in the context of theory evaluation (Thagard 2002),
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de Sousa’s (this vol.) feeling of knowing or Hookway’s (2003a; this vol.) recourse to
Quine’s feeling of simplicity. Even if we grant epistemic value to those latter
phenomena, we may still wonder whether they are emotions.20 Or, to put it
provocatively: have we started to call ‘emotions’ what has always been recognized as
epistemologically relevant, albeit under different labels such as ‘intuition’? Would not
Descartes’ ‘mentis inspectio clara & distincta’ (Descartes [1641], II.12, p. 31),
translated as ‘clear and distinct mental scrutiny’ (Descartes 2002, 21), be a perfect
example of what nowadays many call an ‘epistemic emotion’? To some extent, such
qualms can be dismissed as idle terminological questions about the use of the word
‘emotion’. But this only highlights how important it is for epistemologists to discuss the
question of which mental states and processes contribute to what aspects of epistemic
practice and evaluation.
Notes
We would like to thank Christoph Baumberger, Monika Betzler, Simone Dohle,
Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn, Michael Roth and Alessandra Tanesini for helpful comments
on earlier drafts.
1 See Lazarus (1999) for a short historical account.
2 Hookway (this vol.) appeals to emotions to combine key internalist and externalist commitments;
Alessandra Tanesini (this vol.) introduces the concept of intellectual modesty to account for
fallibilism about knowledge.
3 In the wake of this research, ‘basic’ has sometimes been used meaning ‘being a product of
evolution’. Paul Ekman (1994) maintains that all emotions are basic in this sense. Furthermore, he
now claims that it is actually families of emotions that are basic (Ekman 1999a).
4 Indices of recently published philosophy handbooks suggest that ‘emotion’ is in the process of
replacing ‘passion’ and especially ‘affect’ (but not ‘affective’). In psychology, ‘emotion’ and
‘affect’ are both widely used, though with various meanings as well (cf. Schwarz and Clore 2007,
385–6; Plutchik 2003, 62–3).
5 Hookway (this vol.), for example, uses ‘affective’ in this broad sense.
6 Ryle (1949, ch. 4) discusses many such sources of potential misunderstandings.
7 For further differentiation between dispositions and character traits see Goldie (2000, ch. 6).
8 In his contribution to this volume (p. 000), de Sousa draws another contrast between ‘emotion’ and
‘feeling’. ‘Emotion’ is reserved for phenomena on a personal level, whereas ‘feeling’ includes
subpersonal phenomena as well.
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9 Short historical overviews of theories of emotions can be found in Solomon (1993b) and Lyons
(1999). For parallels and differences of modern theories to ancient Greek accounts see Konstan
(2006, ch. 1). A succinct survey of recent contributions can be found in de Sousa (2003).
10 The terminological muddle is illustrated by the fact that Prinz (2004b, ch. 2) defends his
‘perceptual’ theory as non-cognitive. He relies on his explication of cognition as organismic
control: ‘I propose that we call a state cognitive just in case it includes representations that are
under the control of structures in executive systems, which, in mammals, are found in the
prefrontal cortex.’ (Prinz 2004b, 47)
11 Those who argue that all emotions have response-dependent properties as their formal objects
associate fear with being frightening (cf. Salmela 2006, 386).
12 This is often raised as an objection to accounts along the lines of James and Lange. (See Prinz
2004a, 54–6 for a brief rejoinder.)
13 Griffiths (e.g. 2004b, 234) argues that his view that the emotions do not form a natural kind does
not imply that they do not fall under an univocal concept.
14 Cf. ‘[Our passions] are Good Servants, but Bad Masters, and Subminister to the Best, and Worst
of Purposes, at once.’ (L’Estrange [1699], 38)
15 The issue has been related to western culture’s more general dualism of mind–body, culture–
nature and the like (e.g. White 1993). However, similar oppositions can also be found in Asian
thinking (see Marks and Ames 1995).
16 The motivational function of emotions must not be conflated with the view that there is some kind
of basic affective orientation in life, which motivates or orients scientific as well as philosophical
inquiry. This view, put forward by Heidegger, turns not on emotions but on dispositions to feelings
or moods; in Heidegger’s terminology, ‘Gestimmtheit’ (‘mood’, literally ‘being tuned’) or
‘Befindlichkeit’ (‘state of mind’, better ‘affectedness’).
17 A different point is, that emotions have a huge impact on how effective we learn and on the ways
in which we can later use what we have learned. Neurological studies have turned out ample
evidence for this long standing didactic truism. (Cf. LeDoux 1998)
18 The issue is discussed under labels such as ‘the (philosopher’s) frame problem’ or ‘the search
problem’ and it is debated how the various ways of spelling out the problem are related to each
other (cf. Evans 2002).
19 Introduction of the terms ‘context of discovery’ and ‘context of justification’ is usually attributed
to Reichenbach (1938; in German, Reichenbach introduced a distinction between ‘process of
discovery’ and ‘process of justification’ in Reichenbach 1935). However, the distinction was
common ground for the logical empiricists, and there are a range of historical precursors,
sometimes under different labels, such as ‘genesis’ vs. ‘validity’ or ‘quid facti’ vs. ‘quid juris’ in
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kant [1781/87], A84/B116; see Hoyningen-Huene 1987, 502–3
for historical details).
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20 In psychology, cognitive and metacognitive ‘emotions’ (e.g. surprise, feelings of familiarity and
accessibility of information; see Schwarz and Clore 2007) are sometimes termed ‘nonaffective’
(e.g. Bless et al. 2004) or ‘nonemotional’ (e.g. Stepper and Strack 1993) feelings and distinguished
from emotions proper.
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